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Abstract
Background: Health reforms in Bulgaria have introduced major changes to the financing, delivery and regulation
of health care. As in many other countries of Central and Eastern Europe, these included introducing general
practice, establishing a health insurance system, reorganizing hospital services, and setting up new payment
mechanisms for providers, including patient co-payments. Our study explored perceptions of regulatory barriers to
equity in Bulgarian child health services.
Methods: 50 qualitative in-depth interviews with users, providers and policy-makers concerned with child health
services in Bulgaria, conducted in two villages, one town of 70,000 inhabitants, and the capital Sofia.
Results: The participants in our study reported a variety of regulatory barriers which undermined the principles of
equity and, as far as the health insurance system is concerned, solidarity. These included non-participation in the
compulsory health insurance system, informal payments, and charging user fees to exempted patients. The
participants also reported seemingly unnecessary treatments in the growing private sector. These regulatory failures
were associated with the fast pace of reforms, lack of consultation, inadequate public financing of the health
system, a perceived “commercialization” of medicine, and weak enforcement of legislation. A recurrent theme from
the interviews was the need for better information about patient rights and services covered by the health
insurance system.
Conclusions: Regulatory barriers to equity and compliance in daily practice deserve more attention from policy-
makers when embarking on health reforms. New financing sources and an increasing role of the private sector
need to be accompanied by an appropriate and enforceable regulatory framework to control the behavior of
health care providers and ensure equity in access to health services.
Background
Bulgaria, a post-communist country with a population of
7.50 million people in 2010 [1] situated in South-East
Europe, joined the European Union (EU) in January 2007.
In the late 1990s, Bulgaria began embarking on major
reforms of its health system. These included introducing
general practice, establishing a health insurance system,
reorganizing hospital services, and setting up new payment
mechanisms for providers [2]. Up to 1998, Bulgaria’s
health system had been mainly financed through general
taxation and was characterized by a number of weak-
nesses, including underfunding, a focus on curative and
hospital services, and lacking incentives for improving
quality and efficiency. The introduction of social health
insurance in 1998 aimed to increase the resources avail-
able for health care, improve efficiency, and regulate the
scope and quality of health services [3,4]. The National
Health Insurance Fund (NHIF) was established in 1999 as
an autonomous institution responsible for collecting
health insurance contributions, paying health care provi-
ders and guaranteeing access to health services for the
insured population [2]. Health insurance contributions
were initially set at 6% of income in 1999, split between
employer and employee at an 80:20 ratio, and reached 8%
and a ratio of 60:40 in 2009 [2,4]. General practitioners
(GPs) are paid on a capitation basis according to the num-
ber of registered persons in their practice.
In addition, patients pay user fees for every consulta-
tion with a GP or a specialist, set at 1% of the minimum
monthly salary (110 Euro in 2008), and per day of hospi-
talization, set at 2% of the minimum monthly salary, for a
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age, patients with certain chronic conditions and other
vulnerable groups of the population are exempted from
user fees [4].
This article, which forms part of a wider investigation of
access to child health services in Bulgaria, describes parti-
cipants’ views of challenges to regulation, as expressed by
users and providers of health services, as well as policy-
makers. This issue has emerged in our study as one of the
key problems associated with access to child health
services and one that has been neglected in the academic
literature. While informal payments in Bulgaria’sh e a l t h
sector have been described previously [5,6], hardly any
investigations have so far been undertaken in Bulgaria or
elsewhere in Central and Eastern Europe about the
broader challenge of regulating provider behaviour in
health systems in transition. Our study aims to start filling
this gap.
The pursuit of equity in access to health services is an
explicit objective of many health systems [7]. However, in
most health systems access to health services is inequita-
ble, with more and higher quality services for the well-off
than for disadvantaged groups of the population who gen-
erally need health services more often but are unable to
obtain them [8].
This paper explores regulato r yb a r r i e r st oe q u i t yi n
accessing health services. Key regulatory functions of
governments in the health system include standard-set-
ting, monitoring and enforcement [9]. These functions
are usually exercised through different regulatory bodies
at national or regional level, including the Ministry of
Health, third party payers, agencies for quality of care
and patient safety, and professional associations. Exam-
ples of regulatory instruments that we have found to be
of particular relevance to the Bulgarian context are
given in Table 1.
As illustrated in Table 1, a number of regulatory instru-
ments are being used in health systems to define the basic
parameters of the system and ensure its functioning. In
this paper, we pay particular attention to those aspects of
regulation that were identified by our respondents as
posing obstacles to equitable access to child health services
in Bulgaria.
Methods
Our study followed a case-study approach using multiple
methods and sources of data: qualitative in-depth inter-
views, an analysis of regulatory documents, and a review
of the literature and existing epidemiological data. The
results of our documentary analysis have been reported
elsewhere [12], and the qualitative research methods
have been described earlier [13,14]. In order to increase
the validity of our findings, respondents included many
different stakeholders: policy-makers, health care provi-
ders, and users of services, from both rural and urban
areas (two villages, one town of 70,000 inhabitants, and
the capital Sofia). Furthermore, considering those likely
to face particular challenges with regard to access to ser-
vices, the sample included users from the country’s Roma
minority, as well as parents and other stakeholders con-
cerned with disadvantaged children. A total of 50 inter-
views were conducted by the lead author in Bulgarian
and English. Participants were recruited by the lead
author from the following groups:
￿ health care providers working with children (n =
13), including GPs, paediatricians, nurses, a dentist,
and a manager of a children’s institution;
￿ parents and carers of young children (n = 12),
including representatives of ethnic minorities and
parents of children with long-term conditions;
￿ policy-makers (n = 10), including representatives of
government departments, the NHIF and interna-
tional organizations;
￿ other stakeholders (n = 15), including organiza-
tions working with the Roma population, with insti-
tutionalized and disabled children, and experts from
academic institutions.
Recruitment was purposive and hardly any of those
approached refused to participate. The interviews were
conducted during four periods of field work between
Table 1 Examples of regulatory instruments and relations relevant to the Bulgarian context
Between government/financing
agencies and patients
￿ Systems of financing and decisions on the statutory health system
￿ Population coverage: setting out the breadth (proportion of population covered), scope (range of
benefits covered), and depth (proportion of benefit costs covered) of benefits
Between financing agencies and
service providers
￿ Provider payment mechanisms
￿ Harnessing the market in contracting for health services
￿ Access of providers to health care markets and financing agencies
Between service providers and
patients
￿ Access of patients to health care providers
￿ Patient rights, litigation, criminal damages
￿ Mandatory reporting by providers of quality information, price lists and performance
￿ Self-regulation of providers through professional codes of practice and voluntary or mandatory
accreditation schemes
Source: Adapted from [9-11].
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depth, broadly based on a topic guide that differed for
providers, policy-makers and users and is available from
the authors upon request. All respondents were given
detailed information about the study and informed con-
sent to participate was obtained. Interviews were tape-
recorded with the permission of the participants and
transcribed verbatim (n = 42), or otherwise detailed
hand-written notes were taken (n = 8). We ensured parti-
cipants’ anonymity and, where requested, confidentiality.
Thematic analysis was undertaken which followed the
principles of grounded theory [15]. In the interpretation
of the interview material, we paid particular attention to
the role of the lead author and interviewer as a physician
coming from Bulgaria and having worked outside the
country for some time, and how this might have influ-
enced the course and content of the interviews. We
derived themes from the data inductively, guided by our
previous knowledge, and looked for deviant cases and
evidence supporting alternative explanations. Ethics
approval was obtained from the School of Health and
Social Studies at the University of Warwick and from the
Bulgarian Sociological Association.
Results
Health insurance contributions, official co-payments and
informal payments for health services
From many interviews it appeared that participants were
not fully informed about the rationale of the health insur-
ance system and why patients had to pay fees for outpati-
ent consultations after having paid health insurance
contributions. The perception was common that the per-
sonal insurance contributions ought to be accumulating
in an individual fund for use by that person in case they
needed health care. Many participants noted the lack of
clarity surrounding insurance contributions and co-pay-
ments and difficulties in obtaining information about
how the system is functioning:
“Id o n ’t really understand the health insurance fund.
My husband has not been to a doctor probably since
the reform took place [in 1998]. However, he is pay-
ing [insurance contributions]. Finally, when he goes
to the doctor, he has to pay again. The other money,
where did it go, it is not clear. I think, it needs to be
accumulating somewhere, doesn’t it? Last time they
told us, he has used the money without going to the
doctor, which cannot be true, can it? Nobody
explains anything to you, if you ask.” (immigrant
mother of three children)
A number of respondents did not seem to have been
informed about the principles of solidarity and risk-shar-
ing which underpins any health insurance system. They
perceived health insurance contributions as unfair because
an individual’s contributions did not necessarily match
their use of health services.
“Unfortunately, those who pay the least [contribu-
tions], use services the most.” (policy-maker)
“The insurance payments should be registered on a
card so that everyone knows what amount of money
they have at their disposal for medical services. At pre-
sent, the person who pays contributions based on 1000
Lev monthly income, and the person who is insured
on 160 Lev income, they both receive the same service.
This, I think, is not normal.” (GP, formerly specialist
paediatrician)
Our respondents described informal payments as being
common in both outpatient services and the hospital sec-
tor. However, several participants viewed them as an
acceptable survival strategy in the current socio-economic
environment:
“The social problems and transformations have a very
serious influence on health professionals. People,
understandably, don’t manage to separate profes-
sional standards and norms from personal interest,
which is absolutely understandable in these times
when one needs to provide for one’s family to sur-
vive.” (policy-maker)
Informal payments in health care need to be seen in
their societal context. Another participant, whose husband
was working as a surgeon, perceived charging patients for
surgery as a necessity, as doctors themselves were “vic-
tims” of over-charging for other services (she gave exam-
ples of a car mechanic and an architect). In her view,
taking money from the “same people” when they came in
need for surgery was justifiable, because a surgical opera-
tion was no less complex than fixing a car or designing an
architectural project.
Charging official fees for child health services (for
example for laboratory investigations or for dental treat-
ments) and informal payments for maternal and child
health services were perceived by the participants as con-
tradicting the government’s formal commitment to prior-
itizing maternal and child health:
“They [the health care providers] know very well that
everybody would do everything for their child and
would give everything and sometimes they take
advantage of that, which I think is unfair. It is true
that there is not enough money for everything, it is
never enough, but for the children’sh e a l t h ,t h e y
should not take advantage in this way.” (mother of a
six-year-old child)
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vices to be less prone to improper practices than adult
services, most interviewees identified informal payments
as a persisting problem in accessing health services:
“Another problem that continues to exist, and it is
not related to the Roma only, is that the family phy-
sicians and not only they, the hospitals as well, con-
tinue to take money which they are not supposed to
take according to the law.” (NGO representative,
mother of a two-year-old child)
Payments for maternity services were described as being
common. One nurse described her experience of paying a
fee in order to ensure good care for her delivery. As she
was a health professional herself, she paid a fee that was
lower than usual, a practice that seems to be common
among health professionals:
“We paid for the delivery. At that time, five years ago,
it was 300 Lev [150 Euro], it wasn’t little money at all.
[...] However, we paid it gladly in order to receive
good service.” (nurse, mother of a six-year-old child)
According to one policy-maker, a pregnant woman
without health insurance who is admitted to hospital for
delivery has the option of paying her health insurance ret-
rospectively, leaving a maximum of three unpaid monthly
contributions. She reportedly needs to arrange this in the
period between admission and discharge. Another partici-
pant said that women pay if they choose to receive addi-
tional or different services, for example a particular
physician to be present, or to have epidural anaesthesia or
elective Caesarian section. Several of our participants
reported cases of inducing birth, so that the date of deliv-
ery coincided with a particular doctor’s duty shift.
As was described above, children under 18 years of
age are officially exempt from user fees. However, some
of the users, providers and NGO representatives in our
study held that, in practice, user fees were still being
charged for consultations with GPs, confirming the find-
ing of other studies that under-the-counter payments
and user fees are often difficult to distinguish [16,17].
“In the beginning, when the health reform started, the
consultations for children had to be free, but until
things settled, they charged user fees for children, even
for them. It depends on the physician. Maybe simply
some of them had not yet understood fully how things
were.” (mother of a six-year-old child)
If parents are not well informed and have less bargain-
ing power, they seem to be more often asked to pay
user fees and other charges. People with low levels of
education and ethnic minorities seem to be more likely
to be victims of lack of information:
“It happens very often, including in the Roma quarters,
but not only there, that physicians charge user fees
also for children. This happens, although it seems to
me that people are increasingly more informed and
know that it shouldn’t happen. We have heard such
complaints. Physicians are obliged to display informa-
tion on a visible place which health-insured persons
are exempted from user fees, there are different cate-
gories. This is not being done.” (NGO representative)
Uncertainty arises from the co-existence of official co-
payments, seemingly common informal payments, and
frequent changes in regulations specifying for which ser-
vices co-payments are required:
“There are some other kinds of fees. For children, in
principle the investigations are for free. But if I go
with [my son] to the laboratory for them to take a
blood and urine sample from him, then I pay 2 Lev at
the laboratory. The investigation is free, but this is a
different kind of fee.” (father of two children)
Regulation of the private sector
The Public Health Act from 1971 was amended in 1991 to
legalize private medical and dental practice. There are
increasing numbers of private dental surgeries, pharma-
cies, single and group practices for primary care (general
practice), specialist medical practices, diagnostic labora-
tories and private hospitals. The private sector in Bulgaria
can be defined as those providers who do not hold con-
tracts with the NHIF and are paid for their services
directly by patients. Similar to some other countries in
Europe, many specialists working in public hospitals in
Bulgaria also have their own private practice, and mixing
public and private commitments seems to be common,
with doctors using hospital equipment and encouraging
patients to use their private practices. Several participants,
including both providers and users of services, described
cases of doctors recommending patients seemingly unne-
cessary treatments. Offering treatments apparently guided
by financial interest rather than clinical need was per-
ceived as being particularly common in the private sector,
which is not regulated by the NHIF. Furthermore, private
services were associated by our respondents with over-
diagnosing in order to induce need for investigations and
treatment. One father talked about his experience of see-
ing a private paediatric allergy specialist for his son, who
was charging high fees for tests which were also available
under the NHIF at much lower rates. The private doctor
wrote “al o n gp r e s c r i p t i o n ” of drugs that were “for
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consultation with a GP and tests under the NHIF showed
that the child did not suffer any allergy.
Another participant expressed concerns about the
practices in the private sector, such as performing see-
mingly unnecessary surgical operations:
“Unfortunately, the alternative is the private sector
which is also very risky, because very serious irregu-
larities occur there as well.” (NGO representative)
Reportedly referring children to certain specialist pro-
viders or certain pharmacies are further examples of
practices affecting access to child health services:
“Led by financial interests, the GPs refer the parents
and the children always to the same specialist provi-
ders. The parents should have the right of choice and
judgment, rather than the family physicians to impose
their [...] selected specialists.” (policy-maker)
The participants considered appropriate prescribing
practices to be an indication of the professional qualifica-
tion of physicians. However, other factors that influence
prescribing practices were also identified, such as incen-
tives from the pharmaceutical companies producing the
drugs, and material interests from the sales of drugs at
particular pharmacies.
“There are also monetary transactions between the
firms which release the antibiotic and the people who
prescribe it. Everything is a question of material, so-
called, material incentives, regretfully, which contra-
dicts all ethical principles.” (neonatologist)
“The personal physicians work with certain pharma-
cies. They tell the patients where they should go to
buy expensive antibiotics, expensive drugs, while
there are cheaper ones with the same effectiveness
from our [local producer] Pharmachim.” (immigrant
mother of three children)
Perceived causes of failures of regulation
The magnitude and pace of change
Policy-makers and doctors described the speed of change
as a major challenge. The system based on general practi-
tioners was introduced suddenly, with many doctors given
no choice and having had no time to adapt or to under-
stand the meaning and purpose of health reforms.
“Within six months. A total change. This lack of
evolution in fact left the doctors for a long time...,
the doctors themselves didn’tu n d e r s t a n dw h a tw a s
happening, let alone ordinary people.” (policy-maker)
“For us, this [the reform] was very stressful because
we were not given any choice in the year 2000. You
were told ‘Until June you have a job at the polyclinic
as a state employee. From 1
st of July you set-up pri-
vate cooperatives and start working as general prac-
titioners.’ Everyone of us is a specialist. For example,
I am a paediatrician. And suddenly from a paediatri-
cian I have to transform myself into a general practi-
tioner and to work with elderly patients. And up to
that moment, for 16 years, I have dealt only with
children. That was really stressful.” (GP, formerly
specialist paediatrician)
Lack of participation and sense of ownership of the reforms
Another concern expressed by our participants was that
t h er e f o r mh a dn o tr e s u l t e df r o mab r o a dp u b l i cd e b a t e
and a process of participatory decision-making, but rather
imposed top-down in a very short period of time. It seems
to have taken a long time for managers and health care
providers to adapt to the changes, but the adaptation has
been even more difficult for users of health services:
“[I]n our country it has not resulted from an evolu-
tion of public thinking, of perceptions of the people
about the system of public health. In our country it
[the reform] was imposed in a purely administrative
way as a model of the health system in a very short
period of time. At the moment this is the sixth year
since the introduction of the reform. And the public
opinion still does not accept it.” (policy-maker)
One NGO representative noted that the lack of parti-
cipation and consultation in developing health strategies
has undermined the effectiveness and sustainability of
health reforms.
“I think that there isn’tg o o dp l a n n i n ga n dg o o d
strategy because obviously these strategies are not
being developed by a wide circle of specialists or a
wide circle of interested institutions, which would
make the system, so that health care is real.” (NGO
representative)
“Commercialization” of medicine
Some participants believed that health reforms may have
benefited some private enterprises, such as pharmaceuti-
cal companies, but that they have failed to benefit the
population.
“Id o n ’t know what the health policy is, and what is
happening, but it is not in the interest of the people.
It may be in the interest of business, or what. But I
think it is not in the interest of the people.” (village
council worker)
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towards the “commercialization” of health care. The
shift towards a market economy and competition in the
health sector was viewed by some participants as “trade
with peoples’ health”.
“Everything became totally mercantile. That is the big-
gest disadvantage of the reform. The physicians
became ‘single merchants’, the hospitals became ‘trad-
ing companies’. Human health should be the first
priority. [...] Now hospitals are required to present a
financial plan in the first place. Nobody is interested
whether patients have died there, or whether the treat-
ment is effective there. “ (hospital paediatrician)
Another doctor believed that the market principle is
in general unsuitable for the health sector. In her opi-
nion, ensuring the best quality of care should receive a
higher priority than cost-containment:
“They turned the GPs into guards of the Fund. For me
personally, it is a disadvantage that we have embraced
the market mechanism with regards to health care.
Because the market mechanism, if we talk about
goods-and-money relationships, indeed it has proven
its advantages. However, concerning trading with
health, you can’t put that on market principles. [...]
People remain under the impression that this reform
was done with the main aim of minimizing health care
expenditure rather than maximizing the quality of
health care.” (GP)
Inadequate financing of the health system
The apparent high prevalence of direct out-of-pocket
payments to providers in Bulgaria needs to be viewed in
the context of persisting funding shortages in the health
system, resulting in low salaries of health workers and
inadequate financing of health facilities. Several GPs par-
ticipating in our study complained about children’s
exemption from user fees. In their view, the capitation
fee of one Lev [0.50 Euro] per month was insufficient
compensation for the time and costs involved in provid-
ing health services for children:
“I am responsible for the acute illness of a child. I
see her three, four times, because for an infectious
disease she cannot be examined just once and I can-
n o tc l o s et h ec a s ew i t ht h a t .T h e r ei san e e df o ra
follow-up examination. Especially in infancy and
early childhood, the matters are very serious. Chil-
dren don’t pay user fees, they are exempted, and
actually I receive for the whole month only one Lev
capitation fee [...] which should also cover the labour
of the nurse, and the consumables” (GP)
Other categories of patients are exempted from user
fees as well, and this situation does not seem to be
acceptable to GPs, who do not receive payment for con-
sulting these patients. As one GP put it, these exemp-
tions were made at the expense of doctors who are not
compensated by the state for the services they provide
for exempted patients.
“Somehow they make social policy at the expenses of
the working people, of the doctor. This is what
makes me very angry. Now I am a private practi-
tioner. It cannot be that the children and a mass of
people are exempted from user fees. And if the state
has exempted them, I should receive money for
examining them. I examine them numerous times
without receiving any money.” (GP)
This quote indicates that exemptions from user fees
might not be welcomed by all GPs. The exemptions
seem to present disincentives for GPs to register on
their lists a large number of children and chronically/
severely ill adults, who need care and follow-up, but are
not officially required to pay user fees for their consulta-
tions with the doctor.
Weak enforcement of regulations
Our participants recognized that not all legislation was
being fully implemented, which created a discrepancy
between intentions for ensuring accessible and high-
quality services and the reality of service provision:
“The problem is that in Bulgaria very often docu-
ments are enacted, but their implementation is not
required or undertaken by the relevant institutions.
If you review the legislation, the situation in Bulgaria
most probably would appear very good. However,
there is a lack of regulatory acts for implementation,
systems of monitoring and control, and systems of
evaluation, which is a very serious problem.” (policy-
maker)
One policy-maker mentioned the lack of continuity in
implementing certain reforms and the slow and sporadic
character of different activities, which depend to a great
extent on the attitudes of individuals in key positions:
“Unfortunately, what has been decided in the frame-
work of the reform is rarely implemented, or the
activities are very slow or sporadic. Or something
may be undertaken, it is being considered for 2-3
months, it is talked about, and after that it is stopped,
if the responsible person in the ministry or the insti-
tution is not interested to continue the efforts until
they have reached a concrete solution.” (policy-
maker)
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overcoming the problem of informal payments. They per-
ceived this practice as being deeply rooted in the coun-
try’s culture and exposures of cases of corruption in the
media were believed not to have any real consequences:
“This is a problem which I think will not be solved
soon. They [informal payments] have existed for a
long time and are deeply rooted in our culture. There
are many problems with this kind of payments. They
are known officially. They are published again and
again in the press: ‘this hospital, these physicians’, but
the physicians appear in public and say ‘that is not the
case’. There is only talk, but nothing is being underta-
ken and nothing will change.” (NGO representative,
mother of a two-year-old child)
Interestingly, in some cases non-compliance with regula-
tions on behalf of providers is for the perceived benefit of
patients, and it may widen access to care. For example, it
became apparent from the interviews that children who
do not hold Bulgarian passports, or do not have a unique
citizen’s number (EGN), are not entitled to receive health
services. Their parents have to pay for health care pri-
vately. A mother of a child who was a foreign citizen
described her experience as follows:
“We have a problem with our oldest daughter, because
she is not a Bulgarian citizen. When we go to see a
doctor now, we have to pay for her as for an uninsured
person. She doesn’t have an EGN, she doesn’th a v e
anything like that, she is nobody. However, our doctor
has never refused to see her and she doesn’t even take
any money. If it was someone else, I would have to pay
10 Lev per examination, like for an uninsured person.
We wrote to the president about this, we told him we
pay for everything and it’s very difficult for us.” (immi-
grant mother of three children)
One interviewed GP confirmed that this issue is not
resolved administratively, but some physicians consult
children on a good-will basis, although they are not reim-
bursed for the consultations by the NHIF.
“I think access is not arranged in any way for foreign
citizens. But quite often, they are examined on a
good-will basis.” (GP)
According to Order No. 2 of the Ministry of Health
from 2005, foreign citizens pay for medical services
according to prices defined by the respective health facility
[18]. The above interviews were conducted in April 2006.
Subsequent amendments to the Health Insurance Act in
force since January 2007 introduced a new paragraph
(article 33 par. 3), specifying that “foreign citizens or per-
sons without citizenship with permitted permanent stay
on the territory of the Republic of Bulgaria” shall be cov-
ered by the NHIF [4].
In addition, it appeared from the interviews that patients
are sometimes hospitalized for social reasons and not
according to medical need. Different examples were pro-
vided by both providers and users of services. Whether a
child is treated in hospital or on an ambulatory basis may
depend on the parents’ ability to pay for drugs and proce-
dures (such as injections). In primary care, parents pay the
full price of drugs in pharmacies, but if the child is hospi-
talized, the drugs are provided for free. Inability of parents
to pay for outpatient drugs can be a reason for hospitaliza-
tion, so that the child can be treated without putting a
financial burden on the family:
“We hospitalize [...] when the parents for financial-
economic reasons cannot afford the luxury of treat-
ment with injectable drugs as outpatients [...], which
are not at all cheap.” (paediatrician, outpatients
facility)
Insufficient information about the health reforms
A recurrent theme from the interviews was the need for
information about patient rights and services covered by
the statutory system, something that was perceived as a
necessary condition for people to be able to seek appro-
priate care. The participants indicated that, during the
early stages of the health reform, not enough informa-
tion was provided to the public about the changes in
the provision of health services:
“There were lots of changes and very little informa-
tion, very little information. The National Health
Insurance Fund created some websites, telephone
numbers and so on, but in reality this information
does not reach the population. Who has the oppor-
tunity to use the internet to check? Simply a very
powerful information campaign should have been
run in parallel to all this transformation, by the Min-
istry of Health, by the National Health Insurance
Fund, about every change that was happening in the
health system.” (NGO representative, mother of a
two-year-old child)
Users often mentioned that they were not very clear
about their rights and that information was difficult to
come by:
“We are really not very clear about our rights. I
think there is not enough information. There has to
be more, especially in the regions, the small towns
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child)
The interviews indicated that the reforms of health
services in Bulgaria were accompanied by an insufficient
information campaign. According to our respondents, it
was not clear how people should access services, what
services are provided for free, what co-payments are
required from patients, where they need to be regis-
tered, and what documents they need to do so. People
with low levels of education and no access to telephone
or internet reportedly found it particularly difficult to
find their way through the new system. Further chal-
lenges identified by our respondents were frequently
changing lists of services and drugs covered by the
NHIF:
“The bad thing is that almost every year the list of
drugs and investigations and diseases that are cov-
ered by the Health Fund, which treatment is paid by
the Health Fund, they change. Simply, today it is
one thing, tomorrow it is something else, but the
first one is no longer on the list and so on.” (mother
of a six-year-old child)
Discussion
Although, following a qualitative research approach, we
do not claim our study to be representative of users,
providers and policy-makers concerned with child health
services in Bulgaria, we believe that it points to a num-
ber of regulatory challenges associated with health
reform in Central and Eastern Europe that warrant a
closer and more systematic investigation that also cap-
tures changes over time (Table 2).
Over the last two decades, Bulgaria has shared with
many other countries in Central and Eastern Europe the
challenge of moving from a Soviet-style health system, in
which the state was the main funder and provider of
health services, to a more pluralist system with a variety of
funding sources, including a health insurance system, and
a stronger role of the private sector. This has brought with
it an array of regulatory challenges, including how to
establish a sustainable funding system, how to regulate pri-
vate health care providers, and how to address burgeoning
out-of-pocket payments and pharmaceutical expenditures
[19,20].
The establishment of health insurance systems in Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe has been particularly challenging
[19,21,22]. In Bulgaria, one of the aims of introducing the
health insurance system was to increase the level of fund-
ing available for health care. However, the NHIF failed to
raise the expected revenues for a number of reasons and
this has contributed to the failure of regulations to ensure
equity in health care. The most important reason was the
economic situation of the country, with low productivity
and GDP. Second, there was a large number of people
who were unable or unwilling to pay insurance contribu-
tions. According to official data, towards the end of 2007,
the number of health-insured individuals in Bulgaria was
6,647,084, which meant that nearly 1 million people (or
13% of the population) were without health insurance
coverage, with little change compared to previous years
[23]. Socially disadvantagedg r o u p s ,s u c ha st h eR o m a
and the long-term unemployed, have been overrepre-
sented among those without health insurance coverage
[24,25]. Third, the percentage of wages allocated to
health insurance (initially set at 6%) was low compared to
insurance systems in other European countries [26]. In
a d d i t i o n ,al a r g en u m b e ro fp e o p l eo fw o r k i n ga g ea r e
engaged in the informal “shadow” economy and avoid
paying taxes and insurance contributions. A common
practice among private employers is to declare officially a
minimum salary for their employees so that insurance
contributions are calculated on the basis of the minimum
salary rather than the real wages which workers receive
in cash. Nearly two thirds of insured persons in 2006
were insured at a level close to the minimum taxable sal-
ary [26]. Our study indicates that there might be a lack of
motivation to contribute to the NHIF in view of the large
scale of formal and informal payments at the point of
use. These factors result in an unwillingness to partici-
pate in the solidarity system of health insurance and
many people prefer to pay directly for services to public
or private providers when they need health care. This
practice undermines the pooling of risks and leads to
problems of access to services, if uninsured people face
unexpectedly high costs in case of serious illness [27].
Informal payments are a particular challenge to regula-
tion [28]. While informal payments were reported in Bul-
garia before 1998, when the Health Insurance Act was
passed [5,16], the subsequent reforms in health financing,
the introduction of user fees and new provider payment
mechanisms do not seem to have eliminated such prac-
tices [16,29,30], and there are even indications that the
share of out-of-pocket payments has increased [2].
According to a survey in January 2007, doctors were the
occupational group from which respondents had most
often been exposed to corruption pressure over the pre-
vious year [31]. Furthermore, charging user fees to
exempted patients is one of the most commonly reported
breaches in contracts of health care providers with the
NHIF [32].
Increasingly, informal payments are perceived in the
academic literature as a form of corruption [33]. Infor-
mal payments and other forms of corruption may
deprive people of access to health care, and may lead to
overpayments, inappropriate treatments and poor health
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wider societal context. It is less likely in societies where
there is general adherence to the rule of law, transpar-
ency and trust, where the public sector is accountable,
and where the media and civil society are strong [34].
These are precisely the areas that are underdeveloped in
many countries in Central and Eastern Europe [35,36]
and there is now an extensive literature documenting
the widespread nature of informal under-the-counter
payments for health care in this part of Europe [34].
The low salaries of health workers in Central and East-
ern Europe is a factor often mentioned in the literature
on informal payments [31,37], a theme that resonated in
the complaints of GPs in our study about having to
treat children for a very low capitation fee. In view of
the manipulations of user fees for outpatient services
and their impact on access to services for vulnerable
groups, there were plans to abandon them in 2009 [23],
but these provoked protests among general practitioners
[38].
However, regulatory failures go beyond the issue of
informal payments. There are a number of other structural
causes of providers’ non-compliance with regulations. Fre-
quent changes in payment mechanisms and the services
which are partially or fully reimbursed by the NHIF con-
tributed to an uncertain climate as to which co-payments
were legal and which were not. This uncertainty was exa-
cerbated by an insufficient information campaign sur-
rounding the health reforms and increased the
information asymmetry between patients and service pro-
viders. There is little evidence that the involvement of the
population in health reforms has improved in recent years.
Conclusions
Our findings suggest that major challenges facing the pro-
vision of health services in Bulgaria, such as the under-
funding and limited coverage of the health insurance sys-
tem or the existence of informal payments, can be partly
understood as failures to enact and implement appropriate
regulations. While doubts have been raised over the intro-
duction of health insurance systems in countries such as
Bulgaria [20], one reason why they have failed to reach
their objectives is lacking adherence to regulations, under-
lining the need for better implementation. At the same
time, an important finding of our study was that non-com-
pliance with regulations is not only done for personal gain,
but in some cases also for the perceived benefit of patients.
Where regulations do make sense and are perceived as
such by key actors of the health system, several policy
measures could be considered to improve adherence.
These include strengthening professional self-regulation,
enforcing rules of good medical practice, revision of medi-
cal curricula with an emphasis on the ethics of the doctor-
patient relationship, a reform of provider payment
mechanisms, and ensuring quality improvements in ser-
vice delivery. Overall, more attention needs to be paid by
policy-makers to the regulatory frameworks, instruments
and implementation mechanisms needed to accompany
health reforms to ensure health services remain accessible
to the population.
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